The run-up to the signing of the agreement to extend the ceasefire by one year in 1999 could not have been more ominous. The chief interlocutor of the Indian side, Swaraj Kaushal, made an unceremonious exit from the scenario. Kaushal had been in constant touch with the leaders of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN), Isak Chishi Swu and Thuingaleng Muivah, but left things hanging fire. Quite literally at that. On that occasion, Muivah had told this writer (see Northeast Vigil issue no. 1.03 dated August 1, 1999: http://nevigil.freeservers.com/01081999f.htm) that though "it would be unfortunate to miss him", his exit "should not harm the peace process". The NSCN general secretary had expressed dismay at the constant changes in government as well as negotiators. Though such changes worth the mention have hardly taken place in the past one year, nothing concrete on the "real talks" front has happened either.
Following a meeting between the Indian Prime Minister's special emissary Padmanabhaiah and Intelligence Bureau director Shyamal Dutta in Amsterdam, the two sides agreed to extend the ceasefire till Jul 31, 2000. Around the same time as preparations were on to ensure that the guns remained silent in the Naga Hills for 12 more months, the Grand Old Man of the Naga insurrectionist movement, Khodao Yanthan returned to his homeland after a self-imposed exile in London. Yanthan, a close associate of Angami Zapu Phizo, had severed ties with the faction of the almost-defunct Naga National Council (NNC) led by Phizo's daughter, Adino, a few years earlier and joined Swu-Muivah as the NSCN vice-chairman.
Ceasefire or not, the guns did not fall silent. Fratricidal clashes between the Swu-Muivah and Khaplang factions of the NSCN carried on. The NSCN(K) General Secretary Dali Mungro and two of his aides were gunned down by NSCN(IM) rivals on the night of August 18. Matters were on the verge of spilling out of control. The NSCN(K) retaliation, however, never came. The NSCN(IM) did not wash its hands off the killing, and went to the extent of saying that Mungro had been eliminated since he was conspiring to assassinate Swu and Muivah. Till the other day, only lower levels cadres had been falling to the each others' bullets. With the assassination of the Prime Minister of the former, the latter had ensured that the circle had come full after 11 years. It all began with the abortive bid on the life of the then General Secretary of the undivided NSCN - Muivah (see Northeast Vigil issue no. 1.06 dated August 22, 1999: http://nevigil.freeservers.com/22081999f.htm).
The pyrrhic, intermittent clashes continued. So did the furore over the Mungro killing. Next came the allegations. In September, for the first time, Muivah came out with a statement insisting that the Indian government was desperately trying to invent a pretext to abandon the peace process and shift the blame on the NSCN. He warned the Centre that it should desist from "concoting false information and spreading mischievous propaganda." He said the ceasefire was purely between the Centre and the NSCN and not with the 'puppet government' of Nagaland. The Indian government, for its part, extended suspension of Army operations against the NSCN(K) for six more months with effect from October 16, but issued warning to the IM group against violations of ceasefire rules.
The two truces did not ameliorate the situation. The NSCN(IM) "arrested" four officebearers of the apex Ao tribal body, Ao Senden, in October. It wanted the Senden to revoke its resolution restricting the movement of armed cadres with uniforms. The Senden had, in September, resolved that it would not allow the movement of armed cadres from any underground organisation in populated villages, and urged them to leave the villages under the Mokokchung to ensure peace and tranquillity in the district which witnessed a series of factional clashes in past three months. The NSCN(K) wields considerable influence in the Ao-dominated district. This issue, however, did not snowball into a major inter-tribe conflagration. Mungro, incidentally, was an Ao. And when the Lok Sabha polls came, the NSCN(IM)'s call for boycott in Manipur had a marginal effect. Some voted, some did not. In the bargain the Kuki candidate of the Nationalist Congress Party won at the hustings.
The next hiccup for the peace talks were to come on November 29 when Nagaland Chief Minister SC Jamir miraculously escaped an attempt on his life when suspected militants blew up three vehicles of his convoy and killed two policemen near Kohima. Jamir escaped unhurt, and was taken to a security force camp from where he was flown back to Kohima by helicopter. As many as 14 improvised explosive devices (IEDs), planted in the hills running along the highway, were detonated one after another by remote control. Then followed an encounter which continued for almost three quarters of an hour between the escorting police party and the militants. The NSCN(IM) was quick to disclaim any responsibility for the attack. But after three unsuccessful bids on Jamir's life earlier, no one was willing to believe the organisation. Jamir called the ceasefire as a "licence to kill".
The Centre was prompt in directing security forces in Nagaland to "come down heavily" on all violations of agreed ground rules of ceasefire with NSCN(IM), suspected to be behind the attempt on Jamir's life. Security forces launched house-to-house search operations in Dimapur. They closed down the NSCN(IM) liaison office in the town, set up under the ceasefire agreement in 1997, sealed its premises and moved out the cadres. Tension soared. Union Home Ministry officials said, "Over a period of time it was found that the premises of the monitoring cell were being misused and it had de facto become a centre of illegal activities such as extortion, kidnapping, intimidation and illegal sale of lottery tickets." A seemingly contradictory statement issued by the security forces said the step was not tantamount to the breakdown of the ceasefire monitoring of the Ceasefire Monitoring Group (CFMG) since regular meetings involving both the government and the NSCN (IM) representatives could be held at a mutually decided venue. Allegations and counter-accusations followed. The stalemate continued, but semblance of a cooldown came in January 2000 when Padmanabhaiah said the Centre was seriously considering lifting of the ban on NSCN and revocation of Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act in Nagaland.
If the ambush on Jamir was not good enough to derail the peace process, the arrest and subsequent re-arrest of Muivah in Bangkok in January this year almost did it. Muivah's organisation was alleged by an official spokesman to have been in cahoots with the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) of Pakistan. All of a sudden the NSCN(IM) had become the whipping boy for the Centre. Appeals from Indian intellectuals and Naga leaders to the Indian government to urge the Thailand government to release Muivah fell on deaf ears. Despite pressure from the Indian side, the organisation remained steadfast in asserting that without Muivah talks would not proceed. They did not. What did were the slanging match and occasional fratricidal clashes. On paper, the NSCN(IM) was all the more marginalised when the rival NSCN(K) announced a ceasefire with Indian security forces in April.
As NSCN(IM) cadres continued to be arrested by security forces for alleged violations of ceasefire regulations, Muivah's nephew Grinder Muivah was arrested in Calcutta on March 7, upon his arrival from Bangkok for plotting to hijack an aircraft at Aizawl airport in order to secure the release of the NSCN(IM) general secretary. A legal battle followed. The Mizoram government, which all along had wanted to nail the NSCN(IM) for operating in the state, could not substantiate its charges. Grinder was let off on June 21. Next, the Ceasefire Monitoring Group was reactivated in May.
And then came the extension of the ceasefire. Phew!
How the last year went by
